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The recent trial decision of Justice Vickers of the British Columbia Supreme Court in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia1 has reawakened previously quiescent issues 
concerning the implications of Aboriginal title claims in Canada for privately held 
property within potential claim areas.  Previous Canadian judicial decisions have tended 
to downplay any suggestion that Aboriginal title claims would affect privately held land,2 
preferring to consider resolutions, if it came to a judicial decision in favour of Aboriginal 
title, that would be made through restitution of Crown lands along with monetary 
compensation.3  However, as I develop further in Part II, this recent judgment has 
reawakened uncertainty on this point.   
 
In this paper, I will pursue a narrow claim that we should avoid an interpretation of 
Aboriginal title that threatens privately held lands.  In making this narrow argument, I 
will assume that there are valid moral justifications for the institution of private property, 
although my argument will operate agnostically as between different specific 
justifications.4  I will, however, engage more specifically with one particular moral 
account, this being Jeremy Waldron’s arguments on supersession of historic injustice.  In 
Part III, I set out Waldron’s basic argument and begin to engage with some of its limits in 
abstract terms, posing challenges to his account.  In Part IV, I consider, however, whether 
Waldron’s argument could be used to support exactly the sort of balancing test at which 
Justice Vickers’s judgment hints.  In Part V, I challenge that claim and argue instead that 
Waldron’s argument helps to illuminate relevant distinctions but that an awareness of 
these distinctions also ultimately pushes us away from the application of Aboriginal title 
claims directly against privately held property.  In the process of making the argument on 
the narrow point at issue, of course, I thus implicitly (and perhaps controversially) seek to 
                                                 
1                 For discussion of the case, see Dwight G. Newman & Danielle Schweitzer, “Between 
Reconciliation and the Rule(s) of Law: Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia” (2008) U.B.C. L. Rev. 
2  
3  
4  For some such justifications, see: 
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salvage something from Waldron’s supersession thesis that may have bearing in other 




II.  The Doctrine of Aboriginal Title and Its Application 
 
The doctrine of Aboriginal title is a specific doctrine within Canadian law5 recognizing 
an Aboriginal right to land where there was exclusive occupation of particular lands by 
an Aboriginal community prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty over these lands 
and where there is some form of ongoing, substantial relation between the Aboriginal 
community and those lands.6 
 
Past case law has avoided suggestions that Aboriginal title would affect private land 
owners.  Although the legal technique has not followed the simple approach of 
McEachern C.J. in the trial court decision in Delgamuukw (which the Supreme Court of 
Canada interpreted early in its judgment in that case as being that any fee simple grant to 
a third party would give rise to implied extinguishment7 before the Court did not mention 
the matter again), the case law has been almost as adamant.  In Skeetchestn Indian Band 
v. British Columbia (Registrar of Land Titles),8 the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
affirmed a decision that a certificate of pending litigation could not be registered under 
the Land Title Act with respect to upcoming Aboriginal title litigation.  In The Chippewas 
of Sarnia Band case, the main conclusion of the Ontario Court of Appeal on interactions 
of private property and Aboriginal title claims was that it would support an exercise of 
discretion not to grant a title remedy in the case of land now privately owned by innocent 
third party purchasers.9  The same impulse that innocent third parties should not be 
affected would seem present, as well in the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent 
determination in the duty to consult context that claims based on the duty to consult apply 
exclusively against the Crown and cannot be invoked against private companies.10 
Given this background, one could have anticipated another reasonably clear decision that 
Aboriginal title does not affect private land ownership.  Justice Vickers, by contrast, is 
                                                 
5  The doctrine, of course, is not unique to Canadian law, but I present the Canadian version here.  
6  SOURCES FOR THIS STATEMENT OF THE TEST 
7  para. 23 of Delg 
8  
9  para 272 (noting the point in general terms) and para. 275 (stating that “[t]he interests of innocent third 
parties who have relied upon the apparent validity of the Cameron patent must prevail to the extent that the 
Chippewas assert a remedy that either directly or by necessary implication would set aside the Cameron 
patent. In so holding, we repeat here that we do not intend to preclude or limit the right of the Chippewas to 
proceed with their claim for damages against the Crowns.”)  A delay by the Chippewas in bringing their 
claim also factored in the Court’s analysis, although the reasoning on the rights of innocent private 
landholders would appear to have been determinative in any event. 
10  As stated in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73, 
at para. 53, “The Crown alone remains legally responsible for the consequences of its actions and 
interactions with third parties, that affect Aboriginal interests”.  The Court at ibid., para. 56 would 
implicitly have restricted private parties’ duties to Aboriginal communities to traditional tort and contract 
actions. 
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anything but clear.  Indeed, there are different readings on just what Justice Vickers says 
on this point, heightening the complex implications of the judgment.  Some law firms 
have rushed to try to inform clients of the judgment’s implications for private land 
ownership,11 but they have come to seemingly differing interpretations of its 
implications.  For example, Lawson Lundell pointed out that “the decision does not 
suggest that third parties who have received tenures from the provincial government in 
good faith and who have conducted themselves in accordance with those tenures are in 
any way liable to the Tsilhqot’in Nation, even if their activities have affected the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation’s aboriginal rights or title.”12  Borden Ladner Gervais, by contrast, 
concluded that the “opinion on the application of provincial laws raises questions about 
the effect of underlying Aboriginal title on all third party rights derived from provincial 
authority, such as fee simple titles, licences and tenures.”13  Blakes presented what would 
seem to be an intermediate view that “the judge did note that the creation of private 
interests in the Claim Area, such as by fee simple grant from the Province, has not and 
cannot extinguish Tsilhqot’in rights, including aboriginal title. The Court essentially left 
it up to the parties to reconcile the competing interests of the Tsilhqot’in, private parties 
and governments within the Claim Area.”14 
In terms of what he actually says, consistently with the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision in Delgamuukw,15 Justice Vickers considers that only the federal government 
has jurisdiction within the Canadian division of powers to legislate with respect to lands 
affected by Aboriginal title.16  He concludes, then, that Aboriginal title has not been 
extinguished by provincial grants of land in fee simple or of any other interests in land.17  
The implication is that there may be ongoing Aboriginal title interests in land previously 
thought to be held by private owners.18 
 
Indeed, Justice Vickers is explicit in both generating a degree of uncertainty on these 
considerations and attempting to send some calming words about them.  In a passage that 
raises perhaps as many questions as it answers, he writes: 
 
What is not clear from the jurisprudence are the consequences of underlying 
Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title, on the various private interests that 
exist in the Claim Area. While they have not extinguished the rights of the 
Tsilhqot’in people, their existence may have some impact on the application or 
exercise of those Aboriginal rights. This conclusion is consistent with the view of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2001] 1 C.N.L.R. 56 (Ont.C.A).  Reconciliation of competing interests 
will be dependant on a variety of factors, including the nature of the interests, the 
circumstances surrounding the transfer of the interests, the length of the tenure, 
                                                 
11   




16  para. 1039 
17  para. 998 
18  
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and the existing land use. Such a task has not been assigned to this Court by the 
issues raised in the pleadings.19  
 
Although the task was, in Justice Vickers’s own words, “not assigned to this Court”, he 
thus offers a sort of balancing test for assessments of the rival claims of an Aboriginal 
community asserting a title claim and private land owners.  The decision to hint at the 
possibility of such a test may have arisen from a concern as to the impact on 
reconciliation of a simple pronouncement of possible risks to private property. 
 
The reactions to Justice Vickers’s conclusions on private property are one uncertain 
element as the Tsilhqot’in Nation case moves forward.  At this stage, one other court has 
cited to it as raising uncertainties around conclusions to be drawn concerning 
relationships between Aboriginal title and private property.20  What is most surprising, 
perhaps, is what little public reaction it has faced to date, having attracted limited media 
comment.21  In a forthcoming case comment, my co-author and I compare this muted 
reaction to the much more boisterous reactions experienced when similar issues arose in 
Australia.22   
 
Perhaps the reaction has been muted because it is not clear, as yet, what the case means.  
I say this in a strict doctrinal sense in that the judgment itself ends up declining to 
recognize the Aboriginal title claim at issue, or even to make an order, but instead offers 
what it calls an “opinion” that Justice Vickers hopes can guide further negotiations rather 
than have the matter go back for further trial on unresolved matters.23  It is not clear 
whether that is what will happen or not.  As the different sides commenced onto attempts 
at negotiation, they also all filed for leave to appeal the judgment, and it may work its 
way up the court system.  Nonetheless, the mere fact that the judgment opens the 
prospect of Aboriginal title claims affecting private property marks a significant 
departure from the more reassuring tones of past jurisprudence and properly opens 
discussion on whether Aboriginal title should in fact have that implication.  Even Kent 
McNeil, a prominent academic advocate of Aboriginal rights claims, has retreated from 
this implication to an extent, and although welcoming many dimensions of the judgment, 
he is quick to suggest that in fact individual private property holders should not face the 
effects of Aboriginal title claims but that all of society should in fact offer significant 
compensation to Aboriginal communities with Aboriginal title claims.24  The suggestion 
that individual property owners should not have their titles overturned may seem intuitive 
in some respects, but further analyzing the issues calls for a deeper foray into relevant 
theory.  To enter into the discussion, I turn to a prominent, although contested, argument 
offered by Jeremy Waldron. 
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III.  Waldron’s Supersession Thesis 
 
In a series of articles,25 Jeremy Waldron has stated and restated a thesis that historic 
injustices may in some cases have become superseded by changes in factual 
circumstances such that it is no longer morally obligatory, and perhaps even morally 
impermissible, to correct them.  Within the articles in which he makes this argument, he 
alludes as well to other arguments against reparations for historic injustice, notably an 
argument related to the indeterminacy of what would have happened but for an historic 
injustice given the complex implications of free will.26  Those arguments are 
interesting—if problematic, for taken to the limits of the principle, it would become 
impossible to assess damages for any ordinary torts case, for instance, of loss of future 
income—but they are not my focus here.  I wish specifically to draw on, engage with and 
challenge, but ultimately show the properly limited application of Waldron’s 
supersession thesis. 
 
The thesis begins from a narrow, seemingly innocuous statement: “If the requirements of 
justice are sensitive to circumstances such as the size of the population or the incidence 
of scarcity, then there is no guarantee that those requirements (and the rights that they 
constitute) will remain constant in relation to a given resource or piece of land as the 
decades and generations go by.”27  Taking the point more abstractly, Waldron reasons to 
another conclusion that might seem similarly saccharine: “it seems possible that an act 
which counted as an injustice when it was committed in circumstances C1 may be 
transformed, so far as its ongoing effect is concerned, into a just situation if 
circumstances change in the meantime from C1 to C2.  When this happens, I shall say 
that the injustice has been superseded.”28 
 
Waldron then offers what he considers a specific example of such a supersession of 
historic injustice.  He asks us to imagine a situation of plenty in which group Q seizes a 
waterhole from group P out of sheer greed and insists on sharing it, without sharing 
anything with P.  Q’s taking of the waterhole is a clear injustice.  However, if 
circumstances later change, such that this waterhole becomes the only waterhole that is 
not dry, Q’s ongoing sharing of the waterhole will cease to be unjust, the injustice having 
been superseded by circumstances.29 
 
And, here comes the significant conclusion.  Waldron admits that this argument 
obviously does not mean that every unjust taking of land has had its injustice 
                                                 
25  Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession”, in G. Oddie & R. Perrett, 
eds., Justice, Ethics, and New Zealand Society (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992); Jeremy 
Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice” (1992) 103 Ethics 4; ADD OTHER CITES 
26  Waldron 1992 pp 8-11; Waldron 2002 pp 144-146 
27  1992 p 16 
28  1992 p 24; Waldron 2002 p 155 
29  1992 pp 24-25; Waldron 2002 pp 151-52 
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superseded.30  But he also makes the explicit assertion that the argument might imply the 
supersession of historic injustices against indigenous peoples in North America and 
Australasia, arguing that since white settlement “[t]he population has increased manifold, 
and most of the descendants of the colonists, unlike their ancestors have nowhere else to 
go.  We cannot be sure that these changes in circumstances supersede the injustice of 
their continued possession of aboriginal lands, but it would not be surprising if they did.  
The facts that have changed are exactly the sort of facts one would expect to make a 
difference to the justice of a set of entitlements over resources.”31 
 
One frustrating element of Waldron’s account is that it is offered essentially, and 
repeatedly, as a defensive account, setting up a hurdle that advocates of reparations for 
historic injustices or, more specifically,32 advocates for Aboriginal land rights claims, are 
tasked with overcoming.  Waldron, in other words, does not develop a constructive case.  
He does not flesh out when his argument does or does not challenge a particular claim.  
He sets it out only as a vague obstacle, perhaps leaving us in a genuinely frustrating 
position when we have begun with a vague judicial decision that might arguably now be 
met by vague objections. 
 
Nonetheless, Waldron’s argument has taken on a certain degree of prominence in related 
debates, with many citing to it to at least some extent.33  Indeed, some have become 
actually enraged by it to the point that they dismiss it immediately, without analysis, as a 
racist attempt to justify illegitimate dispossessions of indigenous communities.  So, for 
instance, Dale Turner, in a generally carefully reasoned argument, ends up challenging 
Waldron’s supersession thesis in fairly emotive terms.34  That some would react against 
Waldron’s argument more emotively might be understandable in some respects, but 
emotional reactions seldom get us far in convincing those who hold different points of 
view.  It is important, rather, to engage carefully with Waldron’s argument, to challenge 
it where it needs to be challenged, and to show its limits, or one ultimately surrenders to 
its force amongst those who will cite it without much analysis either, thus giving it a 
force that it arguably does not deserve.35 
 
Waldron’s thesis makes a limited claim, that there may be some circumstances in which 
an injustice becomes superseded by circumstances.  Waldron is ready to interpret this as 
giving rise to an internal limit on the property rights held by an original possessor of land 
or resources,36 thus interpreting, for instance, the original waterhole owner’s claim as 
inherently limited relative to circumstances in which enforcing this claim becomes 
unjust.37  However, his waterhole examples present dramatic circumstances of 
humanitarian need.  That justice might permit overriding rights in certain circumstances 
of dramatic humanitarian need does not necessarily imply an internal limit on the rights 
                                                 
30  
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so much as what one might equally take to be a humanitarian exception that may arise in 
the context of humanitarian emergencies but not as a general rights limitation.38  
Waldron’s waterhole examples do not necessarily prove any more than this more 
moderate claim.  And, indeed, this limited conclusion is not inconsistent with his vaguely 
stated supersession thesis: “an act which counted as an injustice when it was committed 
in circumstances C1 may be transformed, so far as its ongoing effect is concerned, into a 
just situation if circumstances change in the meantime from C1 to C2.  When this 
happens, I shall say that the injustice has been superseded.”39 
 
The question arising is whether injustices are superseded in a wider range of 
circumstances.  Waldron asserts that they are.  But his argument ultimately offers little 
more than a weakly-worded, probabilistic assertion about the history of North America 
and Australasia that “[t]he facts that have changed are exactly the sort of facts one would 
expect to make a difference to the justice of a set of entitlements over resources.”40   
Waldron does not explain exactly how, nor does he offer any genuinely richer argument 
on the point, leaving much for others to discuss. 
 
Waldron’s supersession thesis does raise interesting questions, but its force is potentially 
limited.  What we need to explore further is whether the existence of the possibility of 
supersession has any implications for Aboriginal title claims to privately held property. 
 
 
IV.  Waldron’s Thesis as a Balancing Test 
 
Waldron’s argument is precisely that circumstances may affect the justice of seeking to 
undo a historic injustice.  One natural implication of it, then, might seem to be that it is 
appropriate to have regard to the circumstances in determining the appropriate resolution 
for a particular historic injustice, including for the illegitimate taking of Aboriginal lands 
that might be corrected through the doctrine of Aboriginal title.  On this line of argument, 
then, Justice Vickers’s balancing test might well seem to flow naturally.   
 
Justice Vickers, although not developing it further, states that “[r]econciliation of 
competing interests will be dependant on a variety of factors, including the nature of the 
interests, the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the interests, the length of the 
tenure, and the existing land use.”41  The multifactorial analysis that would flow from 
this statement, and that we may see as a sort of balancing test, is one that seems to fit 
with what might matter in respect of the justice of seeking to correct a historic injustic
various situations.  We can perhaps see this point most clearly by imagining the extremes 
within the various factors Justice Vickers suggests. 
e in 
                                                
 
In Scenario A, we might imagine the following factors: (1) a particular Aboriginal 
community having a particularly strong connection to a specific site – perhaps it was used 
 
38  Cf. Patton 260. 
39  1992 p 24; Waldron 2002 p 155 
40  1992 p 26l; Waldron 2002 p 156 
41  paras. 999-1000. 
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extensively as a particularly sacred spiritual site prior to its having been taken by white 
settlers; (2) the private property owner having only a limited interest in the land, having 
for some reason given back some of the rights in the land to the Crown; (3) the 
historically unjust transfer having been accomplished through brutal violence and fraud 
in which the private property owner’s predecessors were complicit – or, to put the point 
at its strongest, consider even a scenario where the identical private property owner (a 
long-standing corporation) was complicit; (4) the unjust taking of the land having been 
relatively recent; and (5) the land currently being scarcely used, if at all, other than by the 
Aboriginal community itself, which has been permitted to hunt and fish on it. 
 
In Scenario B, we might imagine a different set of factors: (1) the Aboriginal community 
having made little use of the land, such that its use has only barely crossed the threshold 
even giving rise to an Aboriginal title claim; (2) the private property owner seeing a 
particularly strong connection to the land, which has been within the owner’s family for 
generations; (3) the original transfer of the land from the Aboriginal community having 
been accomplished in error rather than through any deliberate taking and the land having 
been transferred between several bona fide purchasers early on, obscuring any error in its 
original acquisition; (4) the private property ownership having stretched back over four 
hundred years; and (5) the land currently being extensively used in ways particularly 
important to the present owner, including parts of it as sacred sites within this owner’s 
religious traditions. 
 
There is, of course, little doubting that Scenario A presents a stronger case than Scenario 
B for restoration of the land to the Aboriginal community from which it had been taken.  
The cumulative difference in these different factors obviously makes a difference, and 
these particular circumstances do matter.  And, one might add, it would not be at all 
unreasonable to conclude that the moral force of the Aboriginal title claim in various 
scenarios between A and B, varying on the different factors, would be proportionate (at 
least metaphorically speaking) to the variation in the different factors.   
 
In as far as Waldron’s argument tracks these circumstantial differences, then, it would 
appear to actually have some truth to it.  Indeed, considering something like Scenario B 
might face down one of the objections we posed to Waldron’s claims in the previous 
section.  Scenario B presents something that may not be the most common scenario in 
respect of private property holdings on land that would have been subject to an 
Aboriginal title claim but that may at least be a possible and even existing scenario.  It 
presents a more realistic scenario than Waldron’s more dramatic waterhole example.  At 
the same time, it presents a scenario in which one can see a strong case that it would be 
unjust to take the land from the private property owner. 
 
There would, of course, be theories of property that would challenge even the claim of 
the private property owner in Scenario B.42  Yet, to the extent that they do so, they run 
counter to significant doctrines of common law property, notably possibilities of 
                                                 
42  
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acquisition through prescription, and accordingly have a strong onus to meet.43  Although 
we cannot within one argument dismiss every possibility of such a case being mounted, it 
seems at least unlikely that such a case can be successfully argued. 
 
Indeed, there are strong reasons to reject an argument that the private property owner’s 
land should be taken in Scenario B.  Specifically, each of the strongest arguments for 
restoring the land itself to the indigenous community even in these circumstances actually 
ends up becoming an argument for the land to remain with the current owner.  Although 
these arguments obviously vary with different theories of property,44 we can consider at 
least some of the better arguments to see that this is so.  Consider, first, an argument that 
the indigenous community that seeks the land under the doctrine of Aboriginal title is 
morally entitled to that land because recovery of the land is important to the community’s 
cultural identity and feeling of wholeness.45  However, by the very factors that have 
varied to give rise to Scenario B, the current owner and that owner’s ancestors have lives 
extensively enmeshed with this land, and the land is vital to their identity.  Thus, an 
argument related to property as identity actually resists the Aboriginal title claim.  
Consider, second, an argument that allowing the current ownership to continue works an 
injustice to the Aboriginal community specifically by treating that community unequally 
in so far as other landowners who had possession of land at the date the land was taken 
were recognized as legitimate owners of that land and this community, along with other 
communities facing this similar discrimination, is uniquely unequally treated.46  
However, here, the fact will be that those not within the scope of an Aboriginal title 
doctrine do not have a claim for restoration of land four hundred years after the fact.  So, 
the claim as to unequal treatment would have been true at the time of the taking but is no 
longer true.  Third, let us consider an argument that the courts work an ongoing injustice 
against the Aboriginal community if they deny recovery of the land, for they effectively 
prefer the imposed Canadian legal system over the law of the Aboriginal community 
deprived of the land.47  This argument might appear most troubling, but ultimately the 
court adjudicating an Aboriginal title claim is applying neither the Canadian legal system 
nor an Aboriginal legal system but an intersocietal body of law,48 within which the bulk 
of opinion is that considerations of morality may properly figure.49  If those 
considerations independently weigh in favour of the current owner, then to fail to 
overturn them is actually to apply properly the intersocietal law.  Thus, the claim of the 
private property owner in Scenario B appears safe. 
 
                                                 
43  Where certain legal frameworks, notably certain versions of the Torrens land registration system, 
remove acquisition by prescription, they do so in a context where there is clear evidence available to 
anyone who seeks it of the legally correct ownership of particular land, something notably not present in 
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That said, there is perhaps a further distinction that I should properly introduce that might 
call into question whether I have applied Waldron’s framework as he would have 
intended.  Waldron’s argument, in some respects, appears to work well in respect of 
moral considerations that affect whether a particular private landowner must give up 
certain specific lands in question.  However, in his pushing towards some implications of 
his argument, Waldron did not couch his factors in terms applicable to these scenarios.  
Rather, he referred to broader societal issues and whether the overall size of a population 
and the general options available to its members diminished the settler community’s 
obligations to the indigenous population for historic injustices.  My scenario has not been 
an overall societal scenario but a specific scenario related to specific persons and specific 
lands. 
 
This objection does not undermine the force of my claims about the moral response to the 
different scenarios or the fact that circumstantial variations between Scenario A and 
Scenario B affect the relevant moral responsibilities arising.  It says, at most, that 
Waldron’s more abstract claims about the moral effect of circumstances contained 
potential not fully realized in his extremely generalized historical claims. 
 
However, this objection might direct our attention to a further distinction and further 
possibility.  Thus far, my examples have linked a claim of Aboriginal title to a specific 
remedy of the return of the land from its present owner to an Aboriginal community with 
a valid Aboriginal title claim.  If there are but two binary options, either that of the 
present owner retaining the land and the Aboriginal community getting nothing or that of 
the present owner returning the land to the Aboriginal community and the present owner 
retaining nothing, then in Scenario B there is a clear case for the present owner retaining 
the land and in Scenario A a clear case for the Aboriginal community recovering the land.  
However, considering the scenarios in a societal context opens other possibilities.  In 
Scenario B, third party wrongdoers in the past took the Aboriginal community’s land.  At 
least part of the injustice of allowing an Aboriginal title claim against the private property 
owner would consist in imposing on this owner all of the responsibility for something 
done by someone else.  Separating the claim from the remedy can open different options, 
such as that of some broader group paying monetary compensation for the land, either to 
the Aboriginal community or to the present owner, the appropriate claim and appropriate 
remedy perhaps both to be determined by a complex set of circumstances.  I now turn, in 
the next section, to the implications of separating the wrong and the remedy, but arguing 
instead that this possibility may actually lead to significant moral reasons not to interfere 
with current private property holdings. 
 
 
V.  Aboriginal Title, Private Property, and Bright-Line Rules 
 
If the prospect of taking land from an individual property owner whose life is now 
enmeshed with that land50 is what drives the moral force of a number of the 
circumstances that figure in Justice Vickers’s test, which I argued in the last section 
                                                 
50  This describes it less agnostically than one could relative to different accounts of property.  Those more 
attracted to a different account of property are free to read this differently. 
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might seem to be an application in some respects of Waldron’s account, then altering the 
possible remedies might seem to remove the moral force of those circumstances in 
respect of the claim and alter only what remedy properly applies.  However, I want to 
argue now that this conclusion actually works against the possibility of restoring privately 
owned lands to Aboriginal communities.  Although the possibility exists of paying 
compensation to private landowners whose lands are found subject to Aboriginal title 
claims, there are independent reasons to prefer the possibility of forms of compensation 
to the Aboriginal communities involved that do not affect the property rights of private 
property owners, other than in rare and exceptional circumstances. 
 
Each of the main arguments for property rights is in fact concerned not just to establish a 
set of powers, immunities, claims, and so on, but a security in the arrangements around 
private property.  Any possibility of submitting landowners’ ownership to a generalized 
multifactorial analysis to determine whether it may continue is to disrupt this security, 
thus giving rise to a prima facie case against a remedial approach relying on removing 
land from private landowners.  Such a remedial approach would effectively impose a 
burden of insecurity against every private landowner in any place where there is the 
possibility of an Aboriginal title claim arising (and this includes, for instance, most of the 
province of British Columbia).  There are inherent reasons to protect the current 
ownership and to compensate in some other way for wrongs of the past.  Whether any of 
these wrongs have been wholly superseded is a different question on which Waldron’s 
argument may raise further questions, but the remedy of taking back privately held lands 
is in any case superseded by the relationship of present landowners to their land. 
 
This claim fits within a broader argument of where bright-line rules are more appropriate 
than multifactorial tests. [...]   
 
That said, there may be rare exceptions to this general proposition.  Where a current 
landowner was actually actively complicit in fraud or other wrongs, there may be good 
reasons to contemplate the option of a remedy that removes the specific landowner’s 
unjust enrichment.  Where there is a particular reason why specific lands are especially 
important to an Aboriginal community, the possibility of expropriating those lands from 
the current landowner, with compensation, may also become appropriate, based on the 
normal set of moral factors applicable to expropriation.  But to set up something other 
than a bright-line rule protecting current ownership against Aboriginal title claims is 
already to cause harm.  It is that harm that Justice Vickers’s reawakening of a prospect of 
new dispossessions awakens, and it is that harm that the Aboriginal title doctrine should 
resist. 
 
In one sense, this puts a narrow point related to a very specific clash of Aboriginal title 
and private property.  In another, however, it provides an illustration of a possible 
application of the supersession of historic injustices.  In so doing, it raises the potentially 
controversial prospect that Waldron’s account of supersession has more to be said for it 
than it first appears.  Though Waldron’s account has little to be said for it at an abstract 
level oriented to broad societal factors, it may have applications to more concrete 
problems, and it is necessary to analyze matters on a case-by-case basis in relation to this 
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possibility.  Attempting to unravel an apparently isolated problem has thus exposed 
possibly broader implications for substantially different scenarios, manifesting the need 
for ongoing and urgent theoretical attention to related matters. 
 
 
 
 
